On paper, Russia had a better military than Ukraine, but "paper" doesn't account for intangible factors like "ability to plan and execute". Moreover, from my understanding, Russian generals or intelligence officials were kept out of the loop until a week or two before the invasion was launched--they planned for a military exercise. So it's possible that the Russian military is a lot more capable, but that Putin foolishly hamstrung it.

The main thing it didn't account for is two decades of graft and mismanagement's influence on operational readiness and troop morale.

The worrisome thing, of course, is that if Russia succeeds in Ukraine (for some value of 'succeeds' that is not complete failure), then there will be some squirrelly part of Putin's brain that will tell him that he could make that work against Romania or the Baltics, which would trigger a direct NATO response.

> which would trigger a direct NATO response.

In spite of everything that has been said about this: or not. I'm not convinced that NATO is going to actually deliver on its obligations, after all, if we're willing to let a country of 45 million people be invaded and murdered wholesale I have a hard time convincing myself that NATO's obligations will suddenly make everything different if for instance say Estonia (much, much smaller) would get invaded.

I've seen this take before, but I don't understand it at all. The whole point of a defensive treaty is to draw a line in the sand. Ukraine is on the other side of that line, unfortunately. This is black and white.

Russia would certainly screech threats of nuclear retaliation in response to conventional defenses, but NATO has no choice but to defend all its members. To do anything else is madness, it destroys the treaty entirely.

A defensive treaty has to be plausible. When NATO was just Western and Southern Europe, it was at least somewhat plausible that the US would go to the brink of nuclear war in its defense. The expansion into Eastern Europe, and especially the expansion into small (and with all due respect, not geopolitically important) Eastern European countries, NATO has lost credibility. The US should not be willing to go to total war in defense in the Baltic countries. Everyone knows that. Honestly, the only reason to take the threat seriously is if you think the US establishment is irrational. And there is reason to think that. See, for example, the hysterical demands for a shooting war with Russia over Ukraine from sitting US Senators and retired generals.

The US should encourage the development of a European army and the creation of a purely European defense pact. Certainly, Germany, France, and Poland have more interest in the Baltics than the US. Then, NATO should be contracted to only include core US interests.

Certainly, the United States had more interest in Iraq and Afghanistan than say Germany, France and Poland.

Indeed it does. Now ponder that for a while. NATO has never been actually tested, except when it was convenient (see: the coalition of the willing/bribed).

I totally understand the point of the treaty. But the treaty never took into account nuclear blackmail - because that is what is happening here - and if that works once I don't see any reason why it would not work again. Country 'x' should leave NATO or we'll nuke everybody. After all, why not? Once you've crossed the line of using nuclear weapons for blackmail I really don't see why you'd stop.

Because strategy isn't binary. Putin expected to gain a certain amount of benefit and suffer a certain amount of cost. It seems like he's paying a higher cost than he'd predicted.

Nothing about that scenario makes it obvious for him to consider paying an even higher cost for a different adventure.

That depends. If you look at it from the perspective of a rational player in a non-zero sum game, then yes, you are right. But if you look at it from the perspective of a gambler with nothing to lose then there is no reason why at some point he would not go 'all in' to get a potential win versus a sure loss.

Well, geopolitics is (generally) rational players in a non-zero sum game. I can't imagine how any world leader could have "nothing to lose", but regardless, it doesn't describe Putin.

This is the problem, it may very well describe Putin.

If Estonia were invaded, that might not seem vital to the US, but it might seem very vital to Poland, Latvia, Romania, Finland, etc., who would all feel quite directly threatened by such an event. They would all be immediately on the phone to Germany, France, and all the other NATO countries.

Ukraine is not a NATO country while Estonia is a NATO country.

Yes, that's why I used those two as examples.