Indeed it does. Now ponder that for a while. NATO has never been actually tested, except when it was convenient (see: the coalition of the willing/bribed).
I totally understand the point of the treaty. But the treaty never took into account nuclear blackmail - because that is what is happening here - and if that works once I don't see any reason why it would not work again. Country 'x' should leave NATO or we'll nuke everybody. After all, why not? Once you've crossed the line of using nuclear weapons for blackmail I really don't see why you'd stop.
Because strategy isn't binary. Putin expected to gain a certain amount of benefit and suffer a certain amount of cost. It seems like he's paying a higher cost than he'd predicted.
Nothing about that scenario makes it obvious for him to consider paying an even higher cost for a different adventure.
That depends. If you look at it from the perspective of a rational player in a non-zero sum game, then yes, you are right. But if you look at it from the perspective of a gambler with nothing to lose then there is no reason why at some point he would not go 'all in' to get a potential win versus a sure loss.
Well, geopolitics is (generally) rational players in a non-zero sum game. I can't imagine how any world leader could have "nothing to lose", but regardless, it doesn't describe Putin.
I totally understand the point of the treaty. But the treaty never took into account nuclear blackmail - because that is what is happening here - and if that works once I don't see any reason why it would not work again. Country 'x' should leave NATO or we'll nuke everybody. After all, why not? Once you've crossed the line of using nuclear weapons for blackmail I really don't see why you'd stop.