So in other words, all someone has to do is hijack the SMS gateway (or fake an SMS from that number), pose as a "rabbit" and get the information delivered straight to them?
Yes, just like real spy rings, if you get infiltrated you are dead. That is rather the point of the game, to teach you how to be clandestine. Better learn now so you're not fumbling the drop when it counts.
But unlike real spy rings, this one is centralized. By how they've described it on that site, everyone must trust the SMS gateway to give them orders, so the gateway becomes a single point of failure.
Which is exactly like a real world Dead Drop, and in the same way that a dead letterbox can be changed when the ring fears discovery, so can the deadSwap gateway. I'm not sure what you aare suggesting, if you could suggest a decentralized way a spy ring might exchange a drop, please let me know.
I thought that when you said "no" you were responding to the whole adverb phrase, not just to the "unlike" adjective phrase. I was correcting that "no"
First, it isn't clear how you request a specific item or file from the network. You can request the USB stick, but who knows what will be on it.
Second, SMS traffic is already tracked for billing purposes, and is tied to a phone number with a billing address (most of the time). It'd be even easier to identify the users of this network than most online networks. You wouldn't know what was being traded without intercepting the USB stick, but still.
Communication regarding file requests are on the Wiki, which is on the USB stick itself. As for your privacy questions, see the section "privacy" and "handbook," deadSwap trains people to be clandestine, it is the behaviour of the people, not the technology that makes the network work, or not.
The coordination of the passing-on of the stick is done through an anonymous SMS gateway, meaning that the system does not require Internet availability and also that, with certain precautions, it can be a very private system that is quite difficult to monitor.
being a super spy is not easy, however with training this sort of infiltration should be easily avoidable by any deadSwap cell. For one, the cell would already have been infiltrated if the "cyber-enforcement division" know the sms gateway number, if the agents are good (and never allow a rabit to see them), the most they could sting is one rabit, who would have deniablility as he is only just now getting the drop.
This seems to be one of the cases where 2.0 has regressed. I can't see any advantage of this over a more standard sneakernet, without any SMS involvement.
While it is true that you'd need to know fewer people, everyone would still need to know everyone else indirectly in order to be admitted in the first place. This is a requirement for the security of the network from infiltrators: someone already on the network would necessarily need to provide you with a "secret" of some form.
By contrast, with a more standard sneakernet, you'd need to know everyone you're in direct contact with -- but that number is typically kept fairly low for social reasons anyway. Data would be distributed more widely by passing through several intermediaries: Bob copies all of Alice's data, then Carol copies Bob's, and now Carol has Alice's data without necessarily having met. This is how people used to pirate software before network access was so common, and it actually worked pretty well.
Want to know who to blame for all the old games asking you to "look up this word in the instruction manual"? It's people doing this.
That you need to know fewer people is significant, and even more so is that you not meet in person that is why the "Dead Drop", "Dead Letter Box", etc is such a common tactic in espionage. deadSwap is a file sharing system/ urban game based on the concept. When done correctly it is very effective and very difficult to sting, thus it has been a standard in spycraft for decades.
