Not really. The original bitcoin client did what was called direct-to-IP transactions, which didn't use hashed pubkeys, and which was vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks (oops).
Bitcoin's ECDSA curve was chosen because it was one of the faster ones, not because of any NIST connection (a "real" cryptographer of the day would have probably advised against the secp256k1 curve used in bitcoin in favor of one of the NIST curves, or DJB's curve which is superior in just about every way.
My point, perhaps too subtle, was that in 2009 there was not sufficient public evidence to suggest such weakening. Rather, the reigning opinion (supported by historical evidence) was that NIST/NSA routinely strengthened standards by selecting parameters so as to make the algorithm secure against publicly unknown mathematical attacks. That is, after all, their stated purpose and what they did with the DES S-boxes.
Turns out, the NSA is a shadow of its former self. But you'd have to have had non-public insider information to have known that with confidence in 2009.
Bitcoin's ECDSA curve was chosen because it was one of the faster ones, not because of any NIST connection (a "real" cryptographer of the day would have probably advised against the secp256k1 curve used in bitcoin in favor of one of the NIST curves, or DJB's curve which is superior in just about every way.