Yes, and then they combine them with a kernel exploit and, uh, suddenly your "unprivileged process" turns out to not be so unprivileged after all.

Resist the temptation to marginalize security bugs. They don't exist in isolation.

You're right, but so is the parent commenter; there is a popular meme that security bugs in general are worth large amounts of money, but in reality only a small subset of bugs command real money.

You could be a better ambassador of our industry by explaining the misconception instead of being condescending. And we wonder why developers think we are just arrogant jerks.

You're welcome to step in and explain, but I think it's pretty obvious why local vulnerabilities in non-setuid binaries aren't exactly "critical."

That would only be accurate if you could trigger one of these bugs remotely.

...or if you can trick the user into opening a malicious file. An exploit in ls? Send them a zip, tarball, etc. with a maliciously named file.

IMHO anyone who contributes to the state of the art with regards to public security tooling is doing the world a favour. Even if the majority of these applications are not well privileged, and therefore of dubious value, applying the same technical knowledge elsewhere could earn them cash. I still applaud their efforts.