The moment there are no more unconfirmed hypotheses you can assume something is wrong with sciences. All provable models (theories, explanations) that we have, or could have, are by definition wrong or incomplete.
I'm guessing you're alluding to Goedel's incompleteness theorem, but that really doesn't apply to physics. It's a statement about certain properties of formal systems - basically it tells us that for any formal system that's at least as powerful as arithmetic, it's impossible to prove every statement that is true in that system.
This doesn't in any way mean that you can't in principle describe with perfect accuracy with such a system, in a provable way, every aspect of physics. Sure, you might need a theorem that can't be proved and be stuck because of that, but it's not a given. Physics certainly doesn't depend on all possible statements in that formal system to accurately model the real world, and so Goedel's theorem can't prove that the subset that physics needs might not be all probable.
I don't think Gödel is necessarily what is meant here, there are very good information theoretical(and other) reasons you can never describe a system with truly perfect accuracy. The map has to be become the territory for genuinely perfect accuracy.
Makes sense, but is it relevant to the upthread claim that "All provable models (theories, explanations) that we have, or could have, are by definition wrong or incomplete"? (Not being rhetorical and snide here, I'm curious and aware I may be missing something.)
If reality has irreducible randomness (an open question afaik), and we're talking about theories and explanations (so we're not necessarily trying to describe the actual state of every particle in the universe, but only the rules governing their interactions), couldn't we have a complete, correct theory that was much smaller than the universe and contained terms for the random elements?
There would always be the possibility that it would turn out to be wrong, but it could be complete and correct, so it seems like the original claim must depend heavily on the word 'provable' and not on the impossibility of describing a system via a map smaller than the territory.
edit: but also, surely 'the territory is randomized' is a contingent physical fact, and not a necessary truth of information theory. Until we know for sure that there is irreducible randomness, we can't know that the information content of the universe (including the actual state of all particles at all times) isn't losslessly compressible, right?
The “elements for randomness” are carve-outs for the parts of territory the map can’t contain. The more granular the map, the larger relative proportion that falls into that set. Nobody can predict the layout of my basement from a globe of the world.
We know with a high degree of certainty the universe contains things we can’t predict or observe, see Bell’s Theorem.
“Truth” doesn’t exist outside reality. There’s no substrate to hang it in. Information theory is likewise a subset of the territory, part of the universe, not apart from it. For these things to exist independently, you need something other than or bigger than the universe to put them in. If such a thing existed, sure, from that perspective maybe a lossless compression could exist. But that’s a metaphysical argument.
That, and the very idea of direct access to the territory (needed for any sort of “lossless compression”, among other things) is moot since we only perceive it indirectly through the lens of our consciousness, which is anything but objective.
