I do not see any reason to suppose this is true. I grant that this is question t...

MrScruff · on Dec 9, 2012

As in, the difference between the neurological processes that govern ones mental state, and the subjective experience of having that mental state.

For example, if I'm hungry and eat a good meal the changes in my brain chemistry that induce the sense of well being that follows are well understood.

That doesn't tell me anything at all about the actual subjective experience of feeling pleasure though. That is something distinct.

rohern · on Dec 10, 2012

Is it? The signals in your nervous system that give you the sensation of pain are pain.

Let me make an argument by analogy.

You are saying that understanding the chip architecture and the instruction set of a computer does not allow you to understand what it is like for that chip to run a given program. Is that a fair analogy? Can you improve it?

If this is a fair analogy, then I think it is clear that you are wrong. We absolutely can understand what running a given program is like. We may need to use a different vocabulary and abstract away detail in order to efficiently communicate the idea of running the program (say, talk about a data structure rather than the individual bits that compose it), but that is true in every field. This is basic tool of reasoning.

If that is not a good analogy, please let me know how. I am not satisfied at all that I understand what you mean when you write "the actual subjective experience". I understand what those words mean but I cannot match them with an object.

MrScruff · on Dec 10, 2012

Essentially your argument is that consciousness doesn't exist. That we are equivalent to highly sophisticated computers running a program, is that correct?

The problem with this argument is that your conscious perception is actually the only thing you can know to exist. Everything else is sense data fed into that consciousness. You assume that the external world that manifests itself via sense data exists because it appears consistent.

But as I sit here typing this the only thing I can know with certainty is that 'I' exist and am conscious (by definition).

This process of being conscious, of perceiving the world, is what I am arguing is outside the realm of science.

Now I know a number of people are of the opinion that if you have a sufficiently complicated machine, biological or otherwise, consciousness will become some emergent property. And maybe this is so. But just saying 'it emerges' is not science. It's hand waving. So instead we have to just accept that for the moment we cannot speak of it.