The thesis argues that dictators regularly both harm groups clearly inside the winning coalition, and please groups clearly outside of it. A common, but not the only reason, is ideology.
One has to be careful when using game-theory models on messy human entities. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't, and it's hard to determine just at what point the model breaks down. At least without empirical research.
(Another example is that actual negotiation outcomes rarely end up at the minimax or Nash product equilibria that game theory sequential negotiation concepts would suggest.)
The thesis argues that dictators regularly both harm groups clearly inside the winning coalition, and please groups clearly outside of it. A common, but not the only reason, is ideology.
One has to be careful when using game-theory models on messy human entities. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't, and it's hard to determine just at what point the model breaks down. At least without empirical research.
(Another example is that actual negotiation outcomes rarely end up at the minimax or Nash product equilibria that game theory sequential negotiation concepts would suggest.)