> I take a slightly more narrow definition of “thoughts” that may be more akin to “expressions” - ideas that can be communicated, so excluding non-linguistic mental processes.
I was glad to read this because it seemed too neat and tidy for "thought" to necessarily be able to be encoded into language, especially in the presence of frequent miscommunication between people that share language, culture, and context.
On language and thinking, I agree that new languages promote thinking differently. But it seems that the difference has to fall short of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of informing perception or experience. Which would then limit the extent to which thought, as informed by language, would influence the way one would compose a linguistic representation of some thought/idea/"blob of meaning to be communicated." All to suggest that there is a broader landscape of "thinking-like activities" than those which would be able to be encoded linguistically.
Maybe it's simpler to say that I think of language as more lossy than thought.
I was glad to read this because it seemed too neat and tidy for "thought" to necessarily be able to be encoded into language, especially in the presence of frequent miscommunication between people that share language, culture, and context.
On language and thinking, I agree that new languages promote thinking differently. But it seems that the difference has to fall short of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of informing perception or experience. Which would then limit the extent to which thought, as informed by language, would influence the way one would compose a linguistic representation of some thought/idea/"blob of meaning to be communicated." All to suggest that there is a broader landscape of "thinking-like activities" than those which would be able to be encoded linguistically.
Maybe it's simpler to say that I think of language as more lossy than thought.