Makes me wonder if there are engineers on the inside of some of these manufacturers intentionally hiding 0 days so that they can then go and sell them (or engineers placed there by companies who design 0 days)
People have been worrying about this for 15 years now, but there's not much evidence of it actually happening.
One possible reason: knowing about a vulnerability is a relatively small amount of the work in providing customers with a working exploit chain, and an even smaller amount of the economically valuable labor. When you read about the prices "vulnerabilities" get on the grey market, you're really seeing an all-in price that includes value generated over time. Being an insider with source code access might get you a (diminishing, in 2025) edge on initial vulnerability discovery, but it's not helping you that much on actually building a reliable exploit, and it doesn't help you at all in maintaining that exploit.
good vulnerability / backdoor should be indistinguishable from programming mistake. Indirect call. Missing check on some bytes of encrypted material. Add some validation and you will have good item to sell no one else can find.
Are we just straight up ignoring the Jia Tan xz exploit that happened 10 months ago that would've granted ssh access to the majority of servers running OpenSSH?, or does that not count for the purposes of this question, because that was an open source library rather than a hardware manufacturer?
