From my perspective, the easiest way to design such a system would be to create entries for every 'actor' in the system, feed in as much data as you can get your hands on, and then let the weights sort themselves out. So for example, if you're hanging out with ISIS members obviously your weights would be higher, but even if you're a server at Applebees you'd still be in the system somewhere.
Doing it the other way necessitates some kind of bright-line division, and any such boundary, once defined, becomes susceptible to exploitation. e.g. I won't hang out with the White Nationalist Militia because that puts me "into the system", but I can hang out with insert radical right-wing group where I can talk to 80% of the same people without being flagged. In practice, I imagine that the gradient of extremism is rather gradual and with blurred boundaries.
Are you familiar with FISC? I'd say go familiarize yourself with its case law, but you can't, because it's secret. And it authorizes methods much more powerful and invasive than a simple search warrant. Precedent exists, but nobody outside the national security state actually knows what it is.
You're maybe proposing another line where no spying is legal at all and we should just submit ourselves to the whims of terrorists or other lunatics? Surely there is actually a line where there are tradeoffs between security and privacy and its probably not 0% security and 100% privacy.
Perhaps you think all FISA rulings should be public and any sufficiently savvy malicious actors can just read them to know exactly how to avoid suspicion?
Everything the FISA process overseen by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review can authorize (and much more invasive means, contrary to your claim) can be authorized by regular search warrant.
The FISC process is used when the purpose is foreign intelligence rather than domestic law enforcement, and it exists because prior to that there was no limit on the covered activity when it was done for that purpose.
> Precedent exists, but nobody outside the national security state actually knows what it is.
Based on what?
From my perspective, the easiest way to design such a system would be to create entries for every 'actor' in the system, feed in as much data as you can get your hands on, and then let the weights sort themselves out. So for example, if you're hanging out with ISIS members obviously your weights would be higher, but even if you're a server at Applebees you'd still be in the system somewhere.
Doing it the other way necessitates some kind of bright-line division, and any such boundary, once defined, becomes susceptible to exploitation. e.g. I won't hang out with the White Nationalist Militia because that puts me "into the system", but I can hang out with insert radical right-wing group where I can talk to 80% of the same people without being flagged. In practice, I imagine that the gradient of extremism is rather gradual and with blurred boundaries.