Being a microkernel doesn't automatically make you more robust. If you look at their docs, Hurd has only one feature that's different to Linux and that's a sort of souped up FUSE. But as they realized later, allowing arbitrary unprivileged programs to extend the filesystem like that doesn't mesh well with the UNIX security model. You can write a "translator" that redirects one part of the filesystem tree to another, so you get the same issues as with chroot or symlink attacks. Their proposed solution (never implemented?) is to stop programs paying attention to translators by default if they are running as a different user. There are other cases where translators can DoS apps or do other undesirable things.
The basic problem is that the kernel boundary is a trust boundary. You assume that anything in the kernel is legit and won't try to attack you, which simplifies things a lot. In the microkernel world the original idea was that all the servers would be just ordinary programs you could swap in and out at will. But then the threat model becomes muddied and unclear. Is it OK to run a server that's untrusted? If so, to what extent?
The Hurd seems under-designed as a consequence. To make that vision work you'd need to be willing to depart from UNIX way more, which really means being a research OS.
> Being a microkernel doesn't automatically make you more robust.
No, of course, it doesn't automatically do so. But it makes it a whole hell of a lot easier to write a reliable service, if you don't have to deal with all the crap that a monolithic kernel does. In a very real sense, lines of code are a liability: fewer LoC generally translates into fewer bugs in the software.
I think you'd find Plan 9 interesting. It deals with many of the issues you're talking about in a rather head on way. In fact, it takes things even further than Hurd might, and allows processes to migrate to different processors, which may be contained on completely different machines.
The basic problem is that the kernel boundary is a trust boundary. You assume that anything in the kernel is legit and won't try to attack you, which simplifies things a lot. In the microkernel world the original idea was that all the servers would be just ordinary programs you could swap in and out at will. But then the threat model becomes muddied and unclear. Is it OK to run a server that's untrusted? If so, to what extent?
The Hurd seems under-designed as a consequence. To make that vision work you'd need to be willing to depart from UNIX way more, which really means being a research OS.