I’m not telling you off: I think you raised a common sentiment and I was responding.
I’m disagreeing that the saber rattling from two countries both experiencing civil unrest and economic hardship will translate into an armed conflict for Taiwan (generally) and that the missile buildup in the SCS is “overwhelming” (specifically). My point about US bases adjacent to Taiwan is a specific response: we already have forces with both access to the Pacific and clear lanes to Taiwan, positioned and ready.
The job of the DOD is to let the nation know our military status — and they’re letting us know that the building of US fleets versus Chinese fleets implies a weakness in the 2027-2030 range, which could be utilized by China. But that doesn’t automatically translate into an armed conflict during that period.
More broadly we’re shifting policy to compete (eg, by on-shoring) — but again, that’s different than an armed conflict.
I think navigating this conflict requires we not be hyperbolic in either direction: dismissal nor concern.
I agree with the content of your comment. I hardly think I was hyperbolic when stating "compute might become more expensive, thoughts?". A knee-jerk "whoa calm down" response to people raising such topics will inhibit healthy discussion. Someone said this was a non concern and I defended the value of thinking about it and discussing it. So at that point to say things are getting blown out of proportion is not warranted at all.
I’m disagreeing that the saber rattling from two countries both experiencing civil unrest and economic hardship will translate into an armed conflict for Taiwan (generally) and that the missile buildup in the SCS is “overwhelming” (specifically). My point about US bases adjacent to Taiwan is a specific response: we already have forces with both access to the Pacific and clear lanes to Taiwan, positioned and ready.
The job of the DOD is to let the nation know our military status — and they’re letting us know that the building of US fleets versus Chinese fleets implies a weakness in the 2027-2030 range, which could be utilized by China. But that doesn’t automatically translate into an armed conflict during that period.
More broadly we’re shifting policy to compete (eg, by on-shoring) — but again, that’s different than an armed conflict.
I think navigating this conflict requires we not be hyperbolic in either direction: dismissal nor concern.