Binary analysis only addresses this if you manage to analyze everything involved in the system: OS kernel, utilities, device drivers, bootloader, ROM BIOS, etc. And then you have to not let any untrusted tool touch any of those components.
After all, analyzing the binary file only protects you if you can guarantee that the same bits get loaded into memory and executed unmodified.
Thompson's technique could easily have been extended so that the code that loaded executable pages would look for a binary signature of the login code, and modified it at load time. If you do the same thing for the binary signature of the file loading code, you get the exact same thing Thompson described, but at the level of binary machine code going from disk to memory, instead of at the level of code going from source to executable.
However many levels you analyze, in theory the adversary could have gone one level further in their attack, unless you build everything yourself (including the CPU, presumably).
After all, analyzing the binary file only protects you if you can guarantee that the same bits get loaded into memory and executed unmodified.
Thompson's technique could easily have been extended so that the code that loaded executable pages would look for a binary signature of the login code, and modified it at load time. If you do the same thing for the binary signature of the file loading code, you get the exact same thing Thompson described, but at the level of binary machine code going from disk to memory, instead of at the level of code going from source to executable.
However many levels you analyze, in theory the adversary could have gone one level further in their attack, unless you build everything yourself (including the CPU, presumably).