> The media and general public [...] tends to call widely-accept scientific theories "facts" and treat them as if they are proven true -- when in reality the best science can do is just not yet prove something false.
That Popperian view (published 1934) is itself somewhat problematic, and I'd say obsolete. The distinction between pure unambiguous observation statements and the edifice of theory on top (concepts, operationalisation, hypothesis, test, theory, etc.), stemming from Positivism even before Popper, is also problematic. Even the distinction between analytic (logical, "by definition") and synthetic (empirical, "by observation") statements is problematic, see Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951). Newer approaches see scientific theories as a "web of beliefs" - basically, "empirical facts" and "theory" and "auxiliary theories" are all intertwined.
The question, then, whether science can give us real facts about the real world (beyond what's immediately observable) is subject of an ongoing debate between instrumentalism and scientific realism.
Personally, I come down on the realist side - I think there are electrons and there were dinosaurs, even if I haven't seen them.
And thus, I think it's legitimate to call very well established scientific theories "facts"
(also, btw, because of the "oh, but it's just a theory" response of various anti-science trolls (not you, mind you!)).
Your definition of fact is dangerous to science. As soon as something is declared "fact" (is this done by some sort of high science cleric handing down edicts in an ivory tower or something) it can never be contradicted. All progress in that area will effectively halt, since the assumption is that there is no more progress to be made. I for one thank God we haven't regarded fact in this way, otherwise we may not have General Relativity (among countless other contradictory scientific findings).
That Popperian view (published 1934) is itself somewhat problematic, and I'd say obsolete. The distinction between pure unambiguous observation statements and the edifice of theory on top (concepts, operationalisation, hypothesis, test, theory, etc.), stemming from Positivism even before Popper, is also problematic. Even the distinction between analytic (logical, "by definition") and synthetic (empirical, "by observation") statements is problematic, see Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951). Newer approaches see scientific theories as a "web of beliefs" - basically, "empirical facts" and "theory" and "auxiliary theories" are all intertwined.
The question, then, whether science can give us real facts about the real world (beyond what's immediately observable) is subject of an ongoing debate between instrumentalism and scientific realism.
Personally, I come down on the realist side - I think there are electrons and there were dinosaurs, even if I haven't seen them.
And thus, I think it's legitimate to call very well established scientific theories "facts"
(also, btw, because of the "oh, but it's just a theory" response of various anti-science trolls (not you, mind you!)).