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The latter. The TSA screening process (a recent report had them pegged at 5% effectiveness[0]) is next to worthless and itself creates a security hazard/potential attack vector. The TSA screening process is also entirely reactionary -- shoe removal only became a thing after an attacker tried to hide explosives in their shoes.

If the TSA was pro-active and had a reasonable degree of effectiveness, then I'd be more willing to put up with it. As it stands, the $85 pre-check fee is more of a "pay us money and we won't actively put you at risk for no benefit" fee.

[0] http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/investigation-breaches-u...



How would you make it more effective?


You could remove the TSA and let airlines do their own security checks at the gate. Airlines really don't want their planes hi-jacked.


I don't think anyone would be happy with 'British Airways Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Services, plc.' and friends running surveillance, SIGINT and other spy operations to gather threat intelligence. And, unfortunately, it seems like intelligence-led prevention is the only real way to stop terrorism, detection and attempts at interdiction close to the target are going to fail the same way the TSA fails, due to the vanishingly small number of actual terrorists.


> And, unfortunately, it seems like intelligence-led prevention is the only real way to stop terrorism

I wouldn't expect British Airways to do its own SIGINT but there's no reason why it can't source that info from the current supplier. (And BA already collects the passenger info on the US government's behalf.)

Either way, no one is proposing to tear up the Do Not Fly list, risibly inaccurate as it might be.


Surely that would just defer the problem? Plus, the airlines now have to buy all their own equipment, train their own staff. At the moment, they are 'outsourcing' their airport security to the TSA.

I suppose they could each choose which security checks they are going to carry out, but how would they choose? Based on recommendations from something that looks like the TSA?

It's not clear to me that the airlines would want this responsibility, or would do a better job at it than the TSA.


The airlines actually care about the safety of their planes, because failures have a significant impact in the marketplace. TSA staff don't care to anything like the same extent. If they screw up, they probably get more money and more power, not less.

I suspect you'd get better results if you moved the responsibility to people who care more, and away from people who care less.

Some US airports have opted out of TSA screening, including San Francisco. You could let airlines opt out or work with airport authorities instead. The best solution will probably depend to a large extent on airport layouts.


They would have a serious conflict of interest between getting people on the plane ASAP and checking safety. I already see this when staff are lenient with checking passports and boarding passes.

On top of this, most airlines have terrible customer service, so there's no reason to believe they would provide a better service than the TSA.

The TSA clearly has many faults, and nor can it take all the credit for the lack of terrorist attacks on US flights. However, it has to get some of the credit. It's wishful thinking to imagine this is a simple problem with a simple fix. If you're going to get rid of the TSA, you're going to have to convince the majority of travellers that the extra convenience is not going to come at the expense of safety.


It would be interesting to know how the TSA-free airports are doing. How many passengers is San Francisco losing, or gaining? Given the widespread view of the TSA's lack of competence (which has been easily demonstrated by tests), I suspect it's not losing any.

> most airlines have terrible customer service

It varies. I've been through lots of airline-run security checks outside the USA and they've all been fine.


> Surely that would just defer the problem? Plus, the airlines now have to buy all their own equipment, train their own staff. At the moment, they are 'outsourcing' their airport security to the TSA.

An obvious solution: outsource to not-the-TSA. Say, local security contractors at the airports they operate at, possibly pooling resources with other airlines if there's economies of scale to be had there. Or perhaps a security company employing former security personnel from Israel's airports? I hear they've done pretty well by focusing on the human element.

> I suppose they could each choose which security checks they are going to carry out, but how would they choose?

I'm sure private security companies have plenty of suggestions for things they can upsell you on. There's all kinds of profit motives that simply aren't there in the public sector. This allows some diversification as well: Those interested in flying 'safely' can be swayed by airline X's advertisements about their thorough security procedures, and those not interested in security theater can be swayed by airline Y's advertisements about their no-hassle boarding.

> Based on recommendations from something that looks like the TSA?

Goodness no. At a 5% effectiveness rate, I suspect you'd have better odds winging it.

> It's not clear to me that the airlines would want this responsibility, or would do a better job at it than the TSA.

I'm sure they don't want the responsibility. Responsibility sucks. This article can be read as the TSA avoiding any of that nasty stuff! But the more relevant question is if foisting responsibility for security upon airlines would be effective.

As for doing better than the TSA: That's a low bar, so why not try such a scheme? Best case scenario, it works, clearing the whole issue right up. Worst case scenario: Nothing of value was lost, and we can try something else.


> Goodness no. At a 5% effectiveness rate, I suspect you'd have better odds winging it.

This is bad statistics. The TSA 'failed to detect 95% of airport breach tests' does not mean it fails to prevent 95% of would-be attacks. Just by being there, it prevents some attacks - those people who consider it too difficult to get round the TSA, or those who end up coming up on the NSA's radar as they research ways to do so.

Saying we could just "throw it all away because what's the worst that can happen" is much like a developer saying "let's do a complete rebuild" and we all know how that usually turns out.




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